The International Monetary Fund has expressed concern over the politicisation of board and executive appointments at Ghana’s state‑owned enterprises (SOEs). The warning appears in a Technical Assistance Report titled “Advancing SOE Fiscal Risks Management, Financial Oversight, Governance, and Investment Implementation,” released in July 2026.
The report notes that although Ghana’s legal framework promotes merit‑based appointments, the selection of boards for major SOEs remains highly centralised, with significant influence resting with the Presidency. Active politicians, Cabinet ministers, Members of Parliament and prominent party officials continue to occupy board positions, including leadership roles at major state‑owned entities.
Specifically, the report cites the Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority (GPHA) as an example, noting that its newly inaugurated ten‑member board is chaired by the national chairman of the governing party. It also mentions that the VRA board includes prominent politicians alongside technocrats and a traditional leader. Compared with OECD norms, which caution against active politicians serving on SOE boards and emphasize independent, professional majorities, this represents a significant divergence.
The IMF observes that in Ghana, boards may influence CEO tenures informally but are not ultimately responsible for those appointments. This can discourage boards from robustly challenging management and may incentivise CEOs to respond more to political principals than to the boards responsible for overseeing their performance.
These governance concerns come amid persistent financial and operational challenges facing several SOEs. While the State Interests and Governance Authority (SIGA) reported significant improvements in the overall financial performance of specified state entities in its 2025 State Ownership Report, including combined net profits of GH¢19.8 billion among SOEs, the IMF assessment points to governance weaknesses that could undermine the sustainability of such improvements.
The report concludes that formal and transparent procedures for the selection and appointment of SOE board members and chief executive officers remain insufficiently articulated and institutionalised. The appointment processes for some entities are not guided by clear, merit‑based criteria, competency profiles, or standardised vetting procedures, increasing the risk of politicisation and weakening accountability. This can undermine SOE board effectiveness, dilute fiduciary responsibility, and adversely affect SOE performance.
