A new piece titled “The Difference Between Knowing and Seeing: Why Intelligence Services in Africa Are Still Fighting the Last War” has sparked debate over the quality of intelligence analysis in Ghana. The author argues that the former Director-General of the Bureau of National Intelligence (BNI) mischaracterises the agency’s work, failing to distinguish between intelligence and counterintelligence, and unfairly judging the professional competence of Ghana’s security services.
The piece cites Mark Lowenthal’s definition of intelligence as a process of identifying national security information needs, collecting, processing, analysing and disseminating. It notes that counterintelligence, by contrast, safeguards those processes and information. The article stresses that counterintelligence cannot be neatly confined to a single functional box, as it involves collection, defensive and offensive activities and intersects with human intelligence, analysis, security and law enforcement.
In Ghana, the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act assigns the Internal Intelligence Agency responsibilities for counterintelligence, internal security, violent extremism, terrorism, organised crime and investigations in collaboration with other security agencies. The article argues that presenting criminal investigation, security intelligence and counterintelligence as separate compartments is intellectually unsound, as strategic intelligence and counterintelligence are two sides of the same security intelligence coin.
The author also challenges the article’s claim that the BNI is merely a “criminal intelligence” organisation. It points out that the BNI’s work cannot be judged solely by the visibility of its reports, as much of counterintelligence is deliberately invisible. The piece cites historical examples where the BNI provided early warnings of coups and conflicts—such as the 1972 coup, the 1993/4 Konkomba‑Nanumba war, the 2002 Dagbon crisis and the 2020 Western Togoland attack—but policy-makers failed to act on the advice.
Finally, the article highlights how different political traditions respond differently to intelligence insights, noting the previous New Patriotic Party government’s handling of the Western Togoland issue as an example.
Observers will watch how Ghana’s security establishment reacts to these criticisms and whether reforms are proposed to clarify the roles of intelligence and counterintelligence in the country.
